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WHAT CAN BROWN® DO FOR YOU?:
NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND THE STRUGGLE
OVER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
PAMELA S. KARLAN†
This is a story about two of the most influential texts in
American constitutional law. The first, the Supreme Court’s decision
1
in Brown v. Board of Education striking down de jure segregation of
public schools, has become the most revered opinion in the Court’s
history—the most “super-duper,” to use Senator Arlen Specter’s
2
phrase, of all the Court’s precedents. The second, Professor Herbert
Wechsler’s Harvard Law Review article, Toward Neutral Principles of
3
Constitutional Law, has become the second-most-cited law review
4
article in American history. The final pages of Neutral Principles are
Copyright © 2009 by Pamela S. Karlan.
† Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law
School. I delivered an earlier version of this essay as the Brainerd Currie Memorial Lecture at
Duke University School of Law on March 25, 2008. In thinking about the issues I discuss here, I
benefited greatly from discussions with David Ball, Viola Canales, Lani Guinier, Goodwin Liu,
Jane Schacter, and Neil Siegel.
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Senator Specter used this phrase to refer to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), during
the confirmation hearings for Chief Justice Roberts, in light of the Court’s having had numerous
opportunities to overrule it. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts,
Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 145 (2005) (statement of Sen. Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/senate/judiciary/sh109-158/browse.html; cf. Pamela S.
Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 543 (1999) (“Today,
Brown v. Board of Education, which was a controversial decision in 1954 (and perhaps an
unthinkable one in 1896), is the third rail of judicial nomination: touch it and you die.” (footnote
omitted)).
3. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1959).
4. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 751, 759–60 (1996) (noting that Professor Wechsler’s article is the second most often cited
article after R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)). Brown is
nowhere near the most often cited opinion in Supreme Court history. That distinction goes to
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in fact devoted to arguing that Brown cannot be squared with the
5
demands of principled adjudication.
Over time, the relationship between Brown and Neutral
Principles has changed dramatically. If Neutral Principles were
remembered primarily as an attack on Brown as an unprincipled
6
decision, it would never have had such staying power. Neutral
Principles would then be so firmly on the wrong side of history that
citing it for the proposition that adjudication should rest on reason
7
and principle would be like citing Dred Scott v. Sandford for the
proposition that “when a plaintiff sues in a court of the United States,
it is necessary that he should show, in his pleading, that the suit he
8
brings is within the jurisdiction of the court.”
But that is not how Neutral Principles is remembered. It is
remembered instead for its title—it may have begun the practice of
starting articles with the word “toward” (which suggests in a falsely
modest way that the author is not quite getting all the way there)—
and for its general statement of the features that make judicial review
9
legitimate in a democracy. Its analysis of the decision in Brown has
10
largely been forgotten. And precisely because the tension between
the otherwise forgettable United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (1906), a
citation to which appears at the top of the slip copy of the syllabus to every Supreme Court
opinion to remind readers that the syllabus “constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but
has been prepared . . . for the convenience of the reader.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Communicating and Commenting on the Court’s Work, 83 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2120 (1995)
(alteration in original).
5. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 31–34.
6. See David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065,
1071–73 (2008) (describing how Wechsler’s critique—although “infamous for being obtuse”—
contains the seeds of an important challenge to how courts adjudicate constitutional cases).
7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
8. Id. at 401–02. It is probably safer simply to quote FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a): “A pleading that
states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court’s jurisdiction . . . .”
9. See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 16–20.
10. For reasons that I discuss, attention to the relationship between Brown and Neutral
Principles was revived by the Supreme Court’s decision in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007); see also, e.g., Goodwin Liu,
“History Will Be Heard”: An Appraisal of the Seattle/Louisville Decision, 2 HARVARD L. &
POL’Y REV. 53, 64–65 (2008) (likening Wechsler’s treatment of Brown in Neutral Principles to
the plurality opinion in Parents Involved); Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006
Term—Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121
HARV. L. REV. 4, 91 (2007) (“The prevailing opinion in Parents Involved is . . . clearly
Wechslerian. Exactly like Wechsler, the prevailing opinion purported to be balanced and fairminded—that is what the allusion to the legacy of Brown clearly expresses. Nonetheless, like
Wechsler, the Court ignored the asymmetry between exclusion and inclusion . . . .”).
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Neutral Principles the article and Brown the decision has been
forgotten, the Supreme Court treats Brown as the apotheosis of
“neutral principles,” in particular, of a principle of race neutrality or
colorblindness as the essence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. Neutral principles the idea, if not Neutral
Principles the article, seems to be winning the struggle to claim
Brown for itself.
Brown occupies a peculiar position within constitutional
interpretation. The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have devoted
pages upon pages of their opinions to plumbing the meaning that
constitutional provisions possessed at the time of their framing and
11
ratification. Although the contemporary fixation on originalism
arose from conservative resistance to decisions by the Warren and
12
Burger Courts, professed fidelity to some form of “original
meaning” or “original understanding” now seems firmly in the
ascendancy. For instance, Professor Jack Balkin has sought to show
how constitutional protection of a woman’s ability to terminate her
pregnancy is consistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth
13
Amendment, and Douglas Kendall has founded a progressive think
14
tank devoted to “honest textualism and principled originalism.” But
11. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789–804 (2008) (discussing the
original understanding of the language contained in the Second Amendment); Boumediene v.
Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244–51 (2008) (discussing the scope of the writ of habeas corpus as
understood in 1789). Justice Thomas, in particular, has often argued for a repudiation of existing
interpretations because they do not accord with what he sees as a constitutional provision’s
original meaning. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that “the history of public education suggests that the First Amendment, as
originally understood, does not protect student speech in public schools” despite a long line of
cases recognizing that students possess some level of constitutional protection); Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 58, 58–66 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that congressional power
under the Commerce Clause should be returned to an eighteenth-century understanding of
“commerce” as standing “in contrast to productive activities like manufacturing and
agriculture”).
12. See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1335, 1347 (1997) (“Originalism is an ism, a conservative ideology that emerged in reaction
against the Warren Court. Before Richard Nixon and Robert Bork launched their attacks on
the Warren Court, originalism as we know it did not exist.” (emphasis omitted)).
13. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 passim
(2007).
14. See Constitutional Accountability Ctr., What Is Constitutional Accountability?,
http://www.theusconstitution.org/page.php?id=91 (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
In a forthcoming book, Professor Goodwin Liu, Professor Christopher Schroeder and I
argue that while the original application of constitutional provisions is one important source for
contemporary interpretation, other sources—such as constitutional structure and development,
changed public understanding, and the interaction of constitutional principles with current
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whatever originalism means with respect to other constitutional
issues, when it comes to the Equal Protection Clause and its
application to questions of race-conscious government action, the
15
Court seldom looks back beyond Brown. Put simply, the Court has
abandoned “Framers’ originalism” in favor of “Brown originalism,”
in which Justices claim fidelity, not to what the Equal Protection
Clause meant in 1868, but rather to what the Supreme Court meant in
1954.
Brown itself took a complex stance with respect to originalist
interpretation. In Part I of this Essay, I explore that stance. Although
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court rejected the narrowest
form of originalism, which asks how the framers of a constitutional
provision would have decided a specific issue had it been posed to
16
them at the time, it did anchor its approach in a different form of
original understanding—one that focused on the history out of which
the Fourteenth Amendment had emerged. I suggest that Wechsler’s
critique of Brown lost sight of that history and accordingly failed to
see how Brown’s commitment to racial inclusiveness reflected
principled adjudication.
Part II then turns to the interplay of neutrality and originalism in
the Supreme Court’s controversial desegregation decision, Parents
17
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court invokes Brown but
follows Wechsler. The Parents Involved Court took Brown to require
a symmetrical reading of the Equal Protection Clause: all raceconscious government action, whether it serves to segregate or to
integrate civic institutions, is equally suspect. But in requiring this
high level of generality, the Roberts Court, like Wechsler, has

conditions—are also critical. See GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & CHRISTOPHER
SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2009).
15. For an attempt to discuss the Reconstruction-era understanding of the government’s
role in providing or encouraging racially integrated education, see Brief of Historians as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6–15, Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (Nos. 05-908, 05915), 2006 WL 2922647.
16. Attorney General Meese’s 1985 address to the American Bar Association, which in
some important ways signaled the emergence of the modern focus on originalism, called for a
“Jurisprudence of Original Intention.” See Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Address to the
American
Bar
Association
(July
9,
1985),
available
at
http://www.fedsoc.org/resources/id.49/default.asp. Jack Balkin refers to this approach as “original expected
application” interpretation: it “asks how people living at the time the text was adopted would
have expected it would be applied.” Balkin, supra note 13, at 296.
17. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
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adopted an understanding of neutral principles that fundamentally
undermines the Fourteenth Amendment’s commitment to full civic
inclusion. And it does so by claiming Brown for itself in a striking
way—relying on a distorted version of what the litigants argued,
rather than what the Court decided.
I. BROWN AND WECHSLER
Brown involved challenges by black public school students to
official policies mandating separate schools for black and white
18
pupils. When the case first was argued, in October Term 1952, the
19
Court found itself deeply divided. Aware that “a close vote would
20
likely be a disaster for Court and country alike,” the Court set the
cases for reargument in the next Term, asking the parties to address,
among other things, the following three questions:
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the
State legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or
did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public
schools?
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying
the Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it
would require the immediate abolition of segregation in public
schools, was it nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the
Amendment
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power
under section 5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future
conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such
segregation of its own force?
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2 (a) and (b) do
not dispose of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing

18. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 486–88 (1954).
19. For two detailed accounts of this process, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW
TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 292–
312 (2004); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 582–616 (1975).
20. KLUGER, supra note 19, at 614.
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the Amendment, to abolish segregation in public schools?

At first blush, these questions might suggest that the Justices were
originalists of some stripe. But the two leading accounts of the
Justices’ deliberations show that these questions were a “pretense”
devised by Justice Felix Frankfurter to avoid the appearance of
22
stalling while the Justices tried to reach consensus. And far from
23
relying on the results of this originalist inquiry, the Court’s opinion
instead declared that
[i]n approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the
light of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
24
protection of the laws.

To say that the Supreme Court in Brown sidestepped how the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment acted or thought about school
segregation, however, is not to say that the Court ignored
contemporaneous understanding of the amendment altogether. To
the contrary, Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court explicitly
hearkened back to its earliest decisions concerning the
Reconstruction amendments, which had located their meaning in the
25
particular history of black slavery and emancipation. In 1873, The
26
Slaughterhouse Cases declared that
no one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose
found in [the Reconstruction amendments], lying at the foundation
of each, and without which none of them would have been even
suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and

21. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953).
22. KLARMAN, supra note 19, at 301; KLUGER, supra note 19, at 614–16.
23. Justice Frankfurter’s law clerk, Alexander Bickel, had reported to him after a summer
of reading the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment that “it is impossible to
conclude that the 39th Congress intended that segregation be abolished; impossible also to
conclude that they foresaw it might be, under the language they were adopting.” KLARMAN,
supra note 19, at 304. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955) (setting out Professor Bickel’s understanding
of the legislative history). The Court apparently agreed with this understanding.
24. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954).
25. See id. at 490 n.5.
26. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

KARLAN IN FINAL.DOC

2009]

3/16/2009 3:15:28 PM

BROWN AND NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES

1055

firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly
made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had
27
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.

Thus, although the Court recognized that the Reconstruction
amendments might be read more broadly to include, for example,
forms of involuntary servitude beyond chattel slavery, it concluded
that
what we do say, and what we wish to be understood is, that in any
fair and just construction of any section or phrase of these
amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have
said was the pervading spirit of them all, the evil which they were
designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the
Constitution, until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished,
28
as far as constitutional law can accomplish it.
29

Similarly, the passage from Strauder v. West Virginia on which Chief
Justice Warren relied stated that “[t]he words of the [Fourteenth
A]mendment” were directed at “discriminations” against black
individuals, which the Strauder Court described as “steps towards
30
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.” Put in
contemporary terms, the first opinions construing the Fourteenth
Amendment had treated it as a prohibition on racial subordination
and had recognized its aspiration that blacks become full members of
civic society.
It was in light of that understanding that the Court turned to the
31
constitutionality of public school segregation. To separate black
school children “from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of their race,” the Court declared, “generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
32
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” Precisely
because “the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as

27. Id. at 71.
28. Id. at 72.
29. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
30. Id. at 307–08.
31. Professor Klarman’s discussion of the Court’s internal discussion confirms this point.
See KLARMAN, supra note 19, at 302 (noting that Chief Justice Warren opened the discussion by
stating that the Court could uphold segregation “only” on the premise, rejected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, “that the Negro race is inferior”).
32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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33

denoting the inferiority of the negro group,” segregated educational
facilities “are inherently unequal” and violate the Equal Protection
34
Clause.
As I read Brown, the evil at which the decision was directed was
not an arbitrary or irrelevant use of race to separate similar children
from one another—as would have been the case had a school system
assigned children to different schools on the basis of astrological signs
35
or blood type. Rather, the problem was an invidious use of race:
school segregation reinforced blacks’ subordinate status and
perpetuated the exclusion from mainstream institutions that dated
back to the time of slavery.
So it is something of a puzzle to then read Professor Wechsler’s
account of Brown in Neutral Principles. Wechsler sought to enter two
ongoing debates, one over the legitimacy of judicial review and the
nature of principled adjudication and the other over the Supreme
Court’s recent decisions, particularly in the school segregation cases.
Wechsler’s starting point, set out near the beginning of his article, is
that courts function solely as an (illegitimate) “naked power organ”
when they decide cases based on the identity of the parties before
36
them. Thus, Wechsler condemns the person who “disapproves of a
[judicial] decision when all he knows is that it has sustained a claim
put forward by a labor union or a taxpayer, a Negro or a
37
segregationist, a corporation or a Communist.” To be sure, Wechsler
is making an important point: in a wide variety of cases, the identity
of the litigant should not matter. It is hard to imagine a justification,
for example, for denying compensatory damages to plaintiffs in
medical malpractice cases because they are segregationists or
38
Communists. But there is also a wide array of cases in which the

33. Id. (quoting a lower court opinion).
34. Id. at 495.
35. The canonical citation for the proposition that racial classifications are constitutionally
suspect is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Although the Court cited
Korematsu in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“Classifications based solely upon
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence
constitutionally suspect.”), in which it struck down racial segregation of public schools in the
District of Columbia as a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, it did not
cite Korematsu or discuss what has come to be known as the anticlassification principle in
Brown itself.
36. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 12.
37. Id.
38. Cf. Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1991) (reviewing a wrongful death case
involving a Jehovah’s Witness in which the defendant essentially argued that the victim’s
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identity of a litigant or injured party does matter. The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, for example, recommend that judges take into
account whether a victim is vulnerable or was selected because of the
victim’s race, religion, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual
39
orientation, and sentencing courts often take into account a
40
defendant’s age when deciding an appropriate sentence. Sometimes,
the litigant’s identity is the hinge on which the entire case turns. For
41
example, statutes such as Title VII, the Age Discrimination in
42
43
Employment Act, and the Civil Service Reform Act reject the
doctrine of at-will employment entirely on the basis of an employee’s
status. They treat decisions to hire, fire, or promote employees on the
44
basis of their race, sex, political beliefs, or age differently from
decisions to take personnel actions on the basis of employees’
performances or even such irrelevant factors as their choice of college
45
football team to support.
Wechsler treats the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown as one
preferring the claims of blacks over the claims of segregationists
because of the identity of the litigants. He rejects the idea that “racial
segregation” can be, “in principle, a denial of equality to the minority

religion should preclude her executor from recovering).
39. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (2007) (“Hate Crime
Motivation or Vulnerable Victim”). Indeed, many hate-crime statutes turn on the identity of the
victim.
40. See, e.g., Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 593 (2007) (discussing the district court’s
decision in setting the defendant’s sentence to take into account, among other things, “his age at
the time of the offense conduct” (quoting Joint Appendix at 117, Gall, 128 S. Ct. 586 (No. 067949), 2007 WL 3071558)).
41. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
42. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006).
43. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
44. See 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(2) (providing that federal employees should be evaluated
“without regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status,
age, or handicapping condition”); 29 U.S.C. § 623 (prohibiting discrimination against workers
on the basis of age); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color,
sex, or national origin).
45. Similarly, the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits denial of the right to vote “on
account of race,” turns entirely on whether the challenged disenfranchisement was because of
the plaintiff’s race. If the plaintiff was excluded for some other reason, the amendment is not
implicated. See Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1959) (responding to Wechsler’s criticism of the
White Primary Cases, in which Wechsler asks whether their rationale would prevent a
religiously based party from excluding nonbelievers by pointing out that “the fifteenth
amendment speaks only to racial distinctions”).
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against whom it is directed[,] that is, the group that is not dominant
46
politically and, therefore, does not make the choice involved,”
because he forgets that that is the principle embodied in the Equal
Protection Clause. Because of his insistence on a kind of formal
symmetry, Wechsler denies that racial nonsubordination can be a
principle. How, he asks, can racial nonsubordination be a neutral
47
value?
In one sense, I do not understand Wechsler’s problem. As
Professor John Hart Ely later remarked, “there are neutral principles
48
of every hue. (How about ‘No racial segregation, ever?’).” But one
need not even go that far. To be sure, saying that the Constitution
forbids creating racial out-groups is not neutral with respect to race: it
treats differentiation among individuals on the basis of race
differently from differentiation based on other factors, such as talent
or ability to pay. In that sense, as then-Professor Louis Pollak
explained in one of the first responses to Wechsler’s article, the
decisive constitutional principle underlying Brown is “in a vital sense
49
not neutral.” But that nonneutrality is a product of constitutional
choices—most explicitly in the Fifteenth Amendment, but implicitly
in the Fourteenth as well—rather than judicial willfulness or will. The
Reconstruction amendments were “fashioned to one major end,”
50
namely, “the full emancipation” of black Americans. Still, within the
category of racial groups, a nonsubordination principle can be
neutral, even in Wechsler’s terms: the government can be prohibited
from treating any racially defined group as subordinate or inferior. As
a matter of American history, blacks have been the primary
beneficiaries of the nonsubordination principle, but that position is
entirely contingent: the Equal Protection Clause also protects
Hispanics, Asian Americans, and Native Americans against
51
discrimination on the basis of race or ancestry.
46. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 33.
47. Wechsler argues that the position that “racial segregation is, in principle, a denial of
equality to the minority against whom it is directed . . . . presents problems” because, among
other things, “is there not a point in Plessy” that that is just the construction that minorities
choose to put on it? Id.
48. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 55
(1980); see also Strauss, supra note 6, at 1070–71 (arguing that Wechsler was incorrect in
claiming that Brown could not be justified with neutral principles).
49. Pollak, supra note 45, at 31.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954) (stating that “[t]he Fourteenth
Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a ‘two-class theory’—that is,
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Because Wechsler thought nonsubordination could not serve as a
neutral principle, he found himself casting around for some other
principle that could apply to the injury suffered by black persons
subjected to Jim Crow, and he latched onto the idea that the problem
with segregation was not that it discriminates against black people but
that it denies all people the right to associate across racial lines. His
embrace of the right to associate as the core value at issue in Brown
produced perhaps the most notorious passage in Neutral Principles:
I think, and I hope not without foundation, that the Southern white
also pays heavily for segregation, not only in the sense of guilt that
he must carry but also in the benefits he is denied. In the days when
I was joined with Charles H. Houston in a litigation in the Supreme
Court, before the present building was constructed, he did not suffer
more than I in knowing that we had to go to Union Station to lunch
52
together during the recess.

To paraphrase Professor Charles Black’s masterful 1960 response to
Wechsler, here is where the curves of self-satisfaction and obtuseness
53
“intersect at their respective maxima.” Like Professor Black, “I
think we ought to exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of
54
philosophers – that of laughter.”
Only because Wechsler identified the relevant constitutional
principle as a right of association was he confronted with the problem
he found himself unable to solve: finding a principled way for courts
to choose between those who wished to associate (that is, black
schoolchildren seeking to attend white schools) and those who wished
not to associate (namely, whites who found integration “unpleasant
55
or repugnant.” ) If instead he had treated the central issue as one of
equal civic status, rather than equal government accommodation of
based upon differences between ‘white’ and Negro,” but also reaches discrimination against
Mexican Americans); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640–44 (1948) (holding that
California’s Alien Land Law denied equal protection to citizens of Japanese descent by making
it harder for them to own land than it was for individuals whose parents were “American,
Russian, Chinese, or English”).
52. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 34. For stinging recent exegesis of this passage, see Liu,
supra note 10, at 64–65; Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 28–30.
53. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
422 n.8 (1960) (stating that “[t]he curves of callousness and stupidity intersect at their respective
maxima” in the statement that if segregation communicates a belief in black inferiority this is
“solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it” (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896))).
54. Id. at 424.
55. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 34.
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individual preference, Wechsler would have had no real difficulty in
deciding that whites’ desire to subordinate blacks and blacks’ desires
for equality were constitutionally different from one another.
But whether or not Brown was principled in the sense that
Wechsler used that term in Neutral Principles, the decision marks the
Supreme Court’s greatest triumph. It transformed equal protection
from what Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes derisively once called the
56
“usual last resort of constitutional arguments” into a bedrock
principle of constitutional law. Not for nothing did the Court later
choose the Equal Protection Clause as its vehicle for remaking the
American political system in the reapportionment cases or as the
57
justification for resolving the presidential election of 2000. Precisely
because Brown has become the crown jewel of the United States
Reports, every constitutional theory must claim Brown for itself. A
constitutional theory that cannot produce the result reached in
Brown—the condemnation of de jure Jim Crow—is a constitutional
theory without traction. Even Robert Bork, whose judicial
nomination foundered in no small part because of his article Neutral
58
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems —an homage in
important ways to Wechsler’s argument—has noted that any
constitutional “theory that seeks acceptance must, as a matter of
psychological fact, if not of logical necessity, account for the result in
59
Brown.”
II. SHADES OF BROWN: THE ROBERTS COURT
AND PARENTS INVOLVED
The imperative of keeping faith with Brown is all the more
pressing when it comes to cases involving school desegregation. So
one of the most striking aspects of the Supreme Court’s 2007 decision
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1 was the struggle among the Justices over what Brown meant.
The policies at issue in Parents Involved were promulgated by elected

56. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
57. See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection: Bush v. Gore and the Making of a Precedent, in
THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000, at 159, 194–95 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001).
58. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971).
59. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 77 (1990); see also Brad Snyder, How the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of
Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383 passim (2000) (describing Brown’s apotheosis).
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local school boards in Seattle, Washington, and Louisville,
60
Kentucky. To produce racially integrated schools in the face of
continued residential segregation, each school board took race into
61
account in some pupil assignments. The Supreme Court, by a 5–4
62
vote, held that both policies were unconstitutional.
Before Parents Involved, the Court had not given plenary
consideration to the question of public school desegregation in a
63
dozen years. That hiatus was significant because, in the interim, the
Court had taken a fairly decisive stance on an interpretive issue
posed, but not resolved, by the opinion in Brown: what is the central
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. In his foundational article,
64
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, Professor Owen Fiss
identified two principles that might drive interpretations of the clause:
the “antidiscrimination principle” and the “group-disadvantaging
65
principle.” The former principle, often referred to as an
66
“anticlassification” principle, sees the evil to which the clause is
addressed as the government’s classification and subsequent
differential treatment of individuals along racial lines. It is embodied
in the view that “[a]t the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of
equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must
treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial,
67
religious, sexual or national class.” This principle calls for symmetry
60. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2824
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the policies as reflecting the view of “democratically
elected school boards . . . as to how best to include people of all races in one America”).
61. Id. at 2746 (majority opinion). For details of the Seattle plan, see id. at 2746–48. For
details of the Louisville plan, see id. at 2749–50.
62. Id. at 2746.
63. As far as I can tell, the Court’s most recent decisions had been in Missouri v. Jenkins,
515 U.S. 70 (1995), and Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). Both of those cases had turned
primarily on the question of the federal courts’ power to remedy continued racial isolation in
the schools. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101 (directing that “the District Court should apply our threepart test from Freeman v. Pitts” when “deciding whether a previously segregated district has
achieved partially unitary status”); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491 (holding that “[a] court’s discretion
to order the incremental withdrawal of its supervision in a school desegregation case must be
exercised in a manner consistent with the purposes and objectives of its equitable power” and
articulating three “factors which must inform the sound discretion of the court”).
64. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107
(1976).
65. Id. at 108.
66. E.g., Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1689, 1711 (2005).
67. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2757 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the
Court) (alteration in original) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
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in the treatment of individuals. Although Wechsler might have some
quibbles with its status as a neutral principle, it avoids, at the very
least, Wechsler’s criticism of decisions that turn on the characteristics
of the litigants. Under the antidiscrimination/anticlassification
principle, all individuals enjoy identical protection against adverse
treatment.
By contrast, the group-disadvantaging principle, often referred to
as an “anticaste” or “antisubordination” principle, sees the Equal
Protection Clause as directed toward laws that perpetuate the
historical exclusion of racial groups from full civic participation. It
sees a “constitutional asymmetry” between government action that
“seeks to exclude and that which seeks to include members of
68
minority races.”
At the time of Brown, the Court did not need to pick between
the two principles because both demanded the same result.
Moreover, the doctrinal framework of equal protection analysis was
69
then far less structured. Although Korematsu v. United States had
held that government action resting on race-based distinctions faced
70
“the most rigid scrutiny,” strict scrutiny as a doctrinal category did
71
not emerge until the mid-1960s. And it was not until its decisions in
72
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. and Adarand Constructors,
73
Inc. v. Pena —both cases involving the distinctive practice of
competitive bidding for government contracts—that the Court
embraced the rule that all governmental uses of race were subject to
74
strict scrutiny. So Parents Involved marked the first time that the
Court returned to the issue in Brown—the assignment of children to
public schools—in the context of contemporary colorblind
constitutionalism.
I have discussed the integration of Brown into modern equal
protection doctrine in Parents Involved in some depth elsewhere and
75
will not rehearse it here. Rather, I want to concentrate on how the
Justices deployed Brown in making their arguments.
68. Id. at 2815 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
69. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
70. Id. at 216.
71. See Pamela S. Karlan, Easing the Spring: Strict Scrutiny and Affirmative Action After
the Redistricting Cases, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1569, 1569–70 (2002).
72. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
73. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
74. See id. at 235; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493–94.
75. See Pamela S. Karlan, The Law of Small Numbers: Gonzales v. Carhart, Parents
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Like the ghost of Hamlet’s father, Brown the opinion makes only
a very few, albeit critical, appearances in the Court’s opinion.
Although Brown—and what the promise of Brown was—looms over
the entire case, it is not until the antepenultimate page of the slip
opinion announcing the judgment that the Chief Justice actually cites
76
the Supreme Court’s initial 1954 decision in Brown. And then, in the
course of explaining why Brown supports an anticlassification
approach, he quotes only a fragment of a single sentence from the
opinion. Referring to segregation, the Chief Justice writes that “[t]he
77
impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law.” The Chief
Justice quotes that fragment, which actually involves a quotation of
the district court’s opinion, to support his claim that “[i]t was not the
inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children on
the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional
78
violation in 1954.” But re-placed in its context, the quotation from
Brown shows how the Parents Involved Court posed a false choice.
The sentence immediately preceding the quoted fragment reads,
“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
79
detrimental effect upon the colored children.” And the remainder of
the quoted sentence itself drives this point home: “The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
80
of the negro group.” The vice to which the Brown Court was
pointing was neither the provision of inferior tangible facilities nor
the simple separation of groups. It was subordination. The reduction
of a direct quotation from Brown to a single misleading sentence
fragment illustrates the problem the Parents Involved Court faced in
trying to enlist Brown in the ranks of anticlassification decisions: all of
the ringing language in the Court’s initial opinion sounded in
antisubordination. The Court’s attempt to support the
Involved in Community Schools, and Some Themes from the First Full Term of the Roberts
Court, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1369, 1385–91 (2008).
76. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767 (2007)
(Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Somewhat earlier, the Court quotes
from the second opinion in the Brown litigation, the remedial decision handed down a year
later. See id. at 2765 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)). For a
discussion of that reference, see infra text accompanying notes 83–84.
77. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767 (alteration in original) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)).
78. Id.
79. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added) (quoting a lower court opinion).
80. Id.
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anticlassification principle by relying on the Court’s second opinion in
81
Brown—the 1955 remedial opinion often referred to as Brown II is
even more disingenuous. In concluding that “the Equal Protection
82
Clause ‘protect[s] persons, not groups,’” Chief Justice Roberts wrote
that
[t]his fundamental principle goes back, in this context, to Brown
itself. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)
(Brown II) (“At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in
admission to public schools . . . on a nondiscriminatory basis”
83
(emphasis added)).

But the quoted language, taken in context, was not addressing the
nature of the plaintiffs’ rights; rather it was focusing on how to
balance the plaintiffs’ right to attend desegregated schools “as soon as
practicable”—the language the decision in Parents Involved omits by
using ellipses—against the school systems’ interests in managing the
84
transition to constitutional compliance. Whether the plaintiffs’
“personal interest” stems from an anticlassification principle or a
group-disadvantaging principle is beside the point. Brown II was a
remedial opinion.
Given that the language in the Brown opinions provided little
ammunition for the Court’s position, Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
and Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurrence took another
extraordinary step in their attempt to claim ownership of Brown: they
relied not on what the Court said but on what counsel for the
plaintiffs had argued. Asserting that the answer to the question
“which side is more faithful to the heritage of Brown . . . could not
85
have been clearer,” the Chief Justice quoted from the oral argument:
As counsel who appeared before this Court for the plaintiffs in
Brown put it: “We have one fundamental contention which we will
seek to develop in the course of this argument, and that contention
is that no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause

81. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
82. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2765 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the
Court) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
83. Id.
84. See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
85. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the
Court).
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of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording
86
educational opportunities among its citizens.”

He saw “no ambiguity in that statement”: “What do the racial
classifications do in these cases, if not determine admission to a public
87
school on a racial basis?”
But as Justice Holmes long ago remarked, “[a] word is not a
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
88
circumstances and the time in which it is used.” The lawyer who
made the statement on which the Chief Justice relied, Robert Carter,
was speaking in 1952 in the context of pervasive Jim Crow, under
which racial assignment produced racially segregated schools that had
the purpose and effect of denying black children the educational
opportunities the majority provided to itself. He and all the lawyers
for the plaintiffs in the consolidated cases before the Court were
either staff attorneys or cooperating counsel for the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a group long
dedicated not to abstract principles of colorblindness but to full civic
89
integration of black Americans. When Carter, who is now a

86. Id. at 2767–68 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (No.
1)).
87. Id. at 2768. Justice Thomas was even more lavish in his quotations from and citations to
the oral arguments and briefs in Brown. See id. at 2782–86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
88. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
89. Justice Thomas asserted the opposite:
Most of the dissent’s criticisms of today’s result can be traced to its rejection of the
color-blind Constitution. The dissent attempts to marginalize the notion of a colorblind Constitution by consigning it to me and Members of today’s plurality. But I am
quite comfortable in the company I keep. My view of the Constitution is Justice
Harlan’s view in Plessy: “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens.” And my view was the rallying cry for the lawyers
who litigated Brown.
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2782 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Justice Thomas cited several of
the briefs filed in Brown as well as Judge Constance Baker Motley’s statement at the Court’s
memorial proceedings for Justice Thurgood Marshall that the “Bible” to which Marshall had
turned as a lawyer was Justice Harlan’s dissent. Id. But as Professor Goodwin Liu shows,
Harlan’s view is far more nuanced than the anticlassification view propounded by Justice
Thomas. See Liu, supra note 10, at 55–60 (proposing that Justice “Harlan’s declaration that
‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind’ does not clearly state a categorical principle against
classification by race” but rather means that “the Constitution does not permit government to
validate or perpetuate a race-based system of social hierarchy”).
And as Professor Liu also emphasizes, although Justice Harlan’s ringing phrase still has
resonance, his dissent in Plessy is hardly a model for contemporary equal protection law. See id.
at 54–56 (noting that Harlan “besmirched” his dissent by “attempting to underscore the
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distinguished federal judge, was asked for his reaction to the Chief
Justice’s reliance on his oral argument, he responded sharply: “‘All
that race was used for at that point in time was to deny equal
opportunity to black people,’ Judge Carter said of the 1950s. ‘It’s to
stand that argument on its head to use race the way they use [it]
90
now.’”
The message of Brown for the Chief Justice and his three
conservative colleagues is a symmetrical one: “Before Brown,” the
Court explained, “schoolchildren were told where they could and
91
could not go to school based on the color of their skin.” As Justice
Stevens noted in dissent, there is a troubling deracination to that
account, which bears a startling resemblance to Wechsler’s account of
92
his lunch with Charles Hamilton Houston:
This sentence reminds me of Anatole France’s observation: “[T]he
majestic equality of the la[w], forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.” The

injustice of segregation to blacks with the observation that ‘a Chinaman can ride in the same
passenger coach with white citizens of the United States, while citizens of the black race in
Louisiana’ cannot” (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting))). And whatever the
lawyers who litigated Brown may have thought about that one phrase from Harlan’s dissent,
surely they would not have embraced the first three sentences of the paragraph in which it
appears:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in
prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast to the
principles of constitutional liberty.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
90. Adam Liptak, News Analysis: The Same Words, but Differing Views, N.Y. TIMES, June
29, 2007, at A24. The other surviving lawyer who had argued for the schoolchildren in the
consolidated cases “called the chief justice’s interpretation ‘preposterous.’” Id.
As I suggest elsewhere, Judge Carter’s reaction is reminiscent of the classic scene in
Woody Allen’s Annie Hall in which Allen’s character
is standing in line outside a movie theater and overhears the man behind him
spouting off about Marshall McLuhan’s views of television. [Allen] declares: “You
don’t know anything about Marshall McLuhan’s work,” to which the man replies,
“Really? Really? I happen to teach a class at Columbia called TV, Media and
Culture, so I think that my insights into Mr. McLuhan, well, have a great deal of
validity.” At that moment Woody says, “Oh, that’s funny, because I happen to have
Mr. McLuhan right here,” and McLuhan says, “I heard, I heard what you were
saying. You, you know nothing of my work. How you ever got to teach a course in
anything is totally amazing.”
Karlan, supra note 75, at 1395–96.
91. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2768 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the
Court).
92. See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 34 (observing, based on the difficulty Wechsler and
Houston, an African American, encountered when trying to have lunch in a segregated District
of Columbia, that “the Southern white also pays heavily for segregation”).
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Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who
were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of
93
white children struggling to attend black schools.

For Justice Stevens, “a rigid adherence to tiers of scrutiny”—a
hallmark of the anticlassification approach—“obscures Brown’s clear
94
message.”
Although Justice Breyer’s dissent, like the Chief Justice’s
95
opinion, ends with a discussion of “the hope and promise of Brown,”
Justice Breyer, unlike the Chief, anchored his opinion in the original
animating concern of the Fourteenth Amendment. Rather than citing
Brown itself, he cited the two cases on which the Brown Court had
relied for its understanding that the “basic objective” of the Equal
Protection Clause was to “bring into American society as full
96
members those whom the Nation had previously held in slavery.” By
looking back before Brown, Justice Breyer was able to see that
Brown was directed at policies that did far more than simply classify
children on the basis of skin color; “they perpetuated a caste system
rooted in the institutions of slavery and 80 years of legalized
97
subordination.”
In his written dissent, Justice Breyer then referred to Brown as
“this Court’s finest hour” because Brown challenged and helped to
98
change that history. Perhaps remembering Winston Churchill’s
99
famous use of that phrase at the beginning of the Battle of Britain,

93. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2798 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
94. Id. at 2799.
95. Id. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2815 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873)); see
also id. (“[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in [all the
Reconstruction amendments] . . . we mean the freedom of the slave race.” (quoting The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71)); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880)
(“[The Fourteenth Amendment] is one of a series of constitutional provisions having a common
purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emancipated . . . all the civil rights that the superior
race enjoy.”).
97. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Thus, it was “a cruel
distortion of history” to “equate the plight of Linda Brown (who was ordered to attend a Jim
Crow school) to the circumstances of Joshua McDonald (whose request to transfer to a school
closer to home was initially declined).” Id.
98. Id.
99. Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, Speech Before the House of Commons (June
18, 1940), in BLOOD, SWEAT AND TEARS 305, 314 (1941).
I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle depends the
survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our own British life, and the long
continuity of our institutions and our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy
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when things looked especially dark, Justice Breyer, in his oral dissent,
elaborated, with respect to the majority’s treatment of the precedent
since Brown, that “[i]t is not often in the law that so few have so
100
quickly changed so much.” In Parents Involved, the majority
claimed Brown for a tamed and minimal view of the Fourteenth
Amendment as simply a bar on race-based classifications and not a
promise of full civic inclusion.
*

*

*

In the dark comedy, The Merchant of Venice, Antonio warns
“Mark you this, Bassanio— / The devil can cite Scripture for his
101
purpose.” Brown is, in an important sense, our national scripture.
But in Parents Involved, the Court wrenched Brown free of its
original context. It adopted a reading of Brown that would have been
unrecognizable to the participants whose words it invoked, and in
service of a vision of deracinated neutrality that Brown’s critics, and
not its champions, had advanced. Responding to the Chief Justice’s
invocation of Brown to support his claim that “history will be
102
heard,” Justice Stevens trenchantly quoted back to the Chief his
must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this
Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life
of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands. But if we fail, then the
whole world, including the United States, including all that we have known and cared
for, will sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more
protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us therefore brace ourselves to our
duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last
for a thousand years, men will still say, “This was their finest hour.”
Id.
100. The sentence does not appear in Justice Breyer’s written dissent, but can be heard in
the dissent he read from the bench. Oral Opinion of Justice Breyer at 19:03, 32:54–33:03,
Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (No. 05-908), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/20002009/2006/2006_05_908/opinion; cf. Winston S. Churchill, The War Situation I, Speech Before
the House of Commons (Aug. 20, 1940), in BLOOD, SWEAT AND TEARS, supra note 99, at 341,
347–48.
The gratitude of every home in our Island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the
world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the British airmen who,
undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are
turning the tide of the World War by their prowess and by their devotion. Never in
the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few.
Id.
For an extensive discussion of the function of oral dissents, with particular emphasis on
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved, see Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—
Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 6, 7–13 (2008).
101. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act I, sc. 3.
102. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the
Court).
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dissenting statement earlier in the Term that “[i]t is a familiar adage
103
that history is written by the victors.” If Americans are going to live
in a world of Brown originalism, then it is at least worth remembering
that Brown rested, not on the forms of neutrality that Herbert
Wechsler and the Parents Involved majority embraced, but on a far
richer vision of an integrated society.

103. Id. at 2798 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brewer v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1706,
1720 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).

